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ARTICLES
Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1997 Term
By RIcHARD G. WILKINS,* ScoTT L. WORTHINGTON,**
DAVID M. BucHANAN,*** R. CHAD HALES****
I. Introduction
This Study, the thirteenth in a series,' tabulates and analyzes the
voting behavior of the United States Supreme Court during the 1997
Term.2 The analysis is designed to determine whether individual Jus-
tices and the Court as a whole are voting more "conservatively," more
"liberally," or about the same as compared with past Terms. As in
politics, whether or not a judicial trend is "conservative" or "liberal"
often lies in the eye of the beholder. A lawyer for the American Civil
Liberties Union could well paint an ideological picture of the Court
far different from one sketched by a lawyer for Americans United For
Life.
This Study attempts to remove this subjectivity by applying the
following consistent classification scheme to ten categories of cases
across time: "conservative" votes are those that favor an assertion of
governmental power, while "liberal" votes are those that favor a claim
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
** J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1999.
*** J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1999.
** J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2000.
1. Professor Robert E. Riggs began this study with Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1986 Term, 2 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 15 (1988). Professor Richard G. Wilkins continued the
study in Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 1 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter 1991 Study]. The last four studies, analyzing the 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996 terms, were
published in the HASTnGs CONST. L.Q. See Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court
Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269 (1995) [hereinafter 1993
Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1994 Term, 23 HAS-
TINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme
Court Voting Behavior: 1995 Term, 24 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1 (1996) [hereinafter 1995
Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1996 Term, 25 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 35 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 Study].
2. The 1997 Term covers decisions made from October 1997 to July 1998.
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of individual liberty.3 By tracking the Term-to-Term conservative or
liberal changes in the voting patterns of individual Justices and the
Court as a whole across these categories of cases,' and by applying
standard statistical tests to the resulting data, this study attempts to
provide reliable information regarding the current ideological posture
of the court and its members, as well as conclusions and predictions
regarding its past and future trends. Whether any statistical study of a
process as complex as judicial decision-making can be reliable is, of
course, open to debate.6 But, within the limitations inherent in an
attempt to "number crunch" ideology, this annual survey offers stu-
dents and practitioners information useful for assessing how the Court
or an individual Justice will vote in particular types of cases.
This Term's survey suggests overall liberal movement on the High
Court. Only one category, focusing on state criminal cases, showed
true conservative movement. On virtually every other measure, the
Court is slightly more liberal this Term compared to the 1996 Term.
This movement may result from a general retreat from last Term's
rather conservative posture,7 combined with the continued uneasy
balance of power in swing-vote cases.8 Also contributing to this
Term's liberal shift may be the increased number of cases implicating
issues of federalism and federal jurisdiction. In these categories, the
Court consistently voted in a liberal manner, finding in favor of the
United States9 and for the exercise of jurisdiction.10
Last Term's predictive statistics met with mixed success in fore-
casting this Term's actual voting patterns. The Study most accurately
predicted results for cases involving questions of federal jurisdiction,"
3. There is no single, settled definition of conservatism or liberalism. See generally
M.A. RIF, DICrIONARY OF MODERN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 67-73, 141-52 (1987) (dis-
cussing various possible interpretations of the terms). This Study's definitions, however,
are close to the core ideals of each ideology. See id. at 67 (noting that conservatism "im-
plies fear of sudden and violent changes, respect for established institutions and rulers,
support for elites and hierarchies, and a general mistrust of theory as opposed to empirical
deductions"); see also id. at 142 (asserting that "twentieth-century" liberalism is "com-
pounded of constitutionalism; doubtful of pluralism; certain[ ] of a belief in the virtues of
economic freedom, and less certain[ ] of a desire to restrict government intervention in
most other aspects of life").
4. See infra Data Tables 1-10.
5. See infra Appendix B.
6. See infra note 33.
7. See generally, 1996 Study, supra note 1.
8. See infra Data Table 10.
9. See infra Data Table 9.
10. See infra Data Table 8.
11. See id.
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with an average error of only about 7 percentage points per Justice.
The least accurate predictions were in the First Amendment cate-
gory12 with an average error of over 63 percentage points. The magni-
tude of this latter error is attributable to the fact that only one case
this Term presented a First Amendment issue. With respect to indi-
vidual Justices, last Term's predicted scores were most accurate for
Justice Scalia, with an average error of about 20 percentage points.
The least accurate predictions were for Justice Kennedy with an aver-
age error of over 28 points. Here, too, the small First Amendment
category sample accounted for a significant portion of the prediction
error. The "Category" analysis, introduced last Term and included in
the Study again this Term, indicates that six categories-state criminal
cases,' 3 statutory civil rights,' 4 state civil cases,' 5 federal jurisdiction,' 6
federal criminal cases,'7 and federalism'--are the best indicators of
liberal/conservative predilections among the Justices, while the re-
maining categories-First Amendment 9, federal civil cases2", and
equal protection2' are relatively poor indicators of the Justices'
propensities. 22 "Frontier" analysis, also introduced into the Study last
Term, shows Justice Souter eclipsing Justice Stevens-to define the Lib-
eral frontier (due primarily to his solitary vote in favor of the claim in
the only First Amendment case presented this Term) and Justice
Thomas displacing Justice Rehnquist in defining the outer limit of the
Conservative frontier.3
This Study is divided into sections to make it more accessible to
the reader. The precise details of the statistical analysis-as can be
gleaned from a glance at the equations (and explanations) in Appen-
dix B-are hardly the stuff of light cocktail conversations. But one
need not have an advanced degree in mathematics to understand the
general trends that flow from the Study's analysis. Part II gives a de-
scription of the mode of analysis employed by the Study. Part III fol-
lows with a general overview of this Term's findings. Part IV sets out
12. See infra Data Table 5.
13. See infra Data Table 3.
14. See infra Data Table 7.
15. See infra Data Table 1.
16. See infra Data Table 8.
17. See infra Data Table 4.
18. See infra Data Table 9.
19. See infra Data Table 5.
20. See infra Data Table 2.
21. See infra Data Table 6.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Frontier Charts 1 and 2.
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the Study's numerical tables, graphs, and statistical charts and dis-
cusses-table-by-table and chart-by-chart-the information contained
in them. Parts V and VI describe the methodology (and outcome) of
this year's "Category" and "Frontier" Analyses respectively. Appen-
dices A and B detail the definitions and statistical tests employed by
this Study.
H. Mode of Analysis
The Study is based on the tabulation and mathematical analysis
of each Justice's votes in ten categories. Nine of the categories are
based on the nature of the issues addressed (e.g., First Amendment,
equal protection, etc.) or on the character of the parties involved (e.g.,
state or federal government litigants). 4 The tenth category tabulates
the number of times each Justice voted with the majority in cases de-
cided by a single, or swing, vote.
The first nine categories are designed to detect each Justice's atti-
tude toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme Court deci-
sions-protection of individual rights and judicial restraint. The
tabulation of votes in each category reveals, in broad strokes, the fre-
quency with which individual Justices and the Court as a whole vote to
protect individual rights25 or exercise judicial restraint.26
24. The categories are as follows: (1) civil controversies in which a state or one of its
officials or political subdivisions is opposed by a private party; (2) civil controversies in
which the federal government, or one of its agencies or officials, is opposed by a private
party; (3) state criminal cases; (4) federal criminal cases; (5) First Amendment issues of
freedom of speech, press, and association; (6) equal protection claims; (7) statutory civil
rights claims; (8) issues of federal court jurisdiction, party standing, justiciability, and re-
lated matters; and (9) federalism cases.
25. Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the outcome of
state and federal criminal prosecutions (Tables 3 and 4), as well as those detailing the
resolution of claims based on the First Amendment (Table 5), the Equal Protection Clause
(Table 6), and civil rights statutes (Table 7). The civil cases examined in Tables 1 and 2 also
involve individual rights, as these suits pit the government against persons asserting private
rights. The federalism decisions tabulated in Table 9 are less obviously relevant to individ-
ual rights because such decisions focus on the balance of federal and state authority. Nev-
ertheless, in such cases, the practical effect of voting for the state is to deny federal relief to
a party alleging state encroachment upon his or her rights.
26. Jurisdictional questions (Table 8), which exhibit the relative propensity of the Jus-
tices to avoid judicial decisions, are perhaps the most direct statistical evidence of judicial
restraint. Other Tables included in the Study, however, also provide some indication of the
individual Justices' (and the Court's) positions on the "judicial restraint/judicial activism"
axis. Judicial restraint is normally identified with deference to the policy-making branches
of government, adherence to precedent, avoidance of constitutional bases of decision when
narrower grounds exist, respect for the Framers' intent when construing constitutional text,
and avoidance of issues rendered unnecessary by the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, polit-
ical questions, etc. As a result, a vote in favor of individual rights claims (Tables 3, 4, 5, 6,
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From the voting patterns that emerge, the Study determines
whether individual Justices and the Court are taking "conservative" or
"liberal" positions. The Study classifies outcomes that favor an asser-
tion of governmental power as conservative, and outcomes that favor
a claim of individual right as liberal. Accordingly, the Study classifies
as conservative a vote for the government against an individual, a vote
against a claim of constitutional or statutory rights, a vote against the
exercise of jurisdiction, or a vote favoring state (as opposed to fed-
eral) authority on federalism questions. The Study classifies all con-
trary votes as liberal.
This analytical scheme is not perfect. Unanimous decisions (a sig-
nificant portion of all cases decided by the Court) are included in the
Study's calculations even though liberal or conservative ideology may
not have influenced the outcome of such cases. Unanimous opinions
often result when either the law or the facts, or both, point so clearly
in one direction that ideology is not a decisional factor. Furthermore,
concern for individual rights is not always, or even necessarily, the
attitudinal opposite of judicial restraint.
Despite these difficulties with our classification scheme, the basic
assumption that supports this Study - that the general orientation of
individual Justices and the Court to individual rights and judicial re-
straint is suggestive of conservative or liberal ideology - appears
sound.27 For example, deference to legislatures frequently results in
rejection of an individual's claim, especially one predicated upon the
impropriety of governmental action.2' Judicial restraint is associated
with a reluctance to read new rights into the Constitution or a stat-
ute.29 Refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction leaves the matter to
state courts with their possible bias in favor of state governmental ac-
tion and is a clear rebuff to the claimant seeking federal protection of
7) may provide some indication of "judicial activism" because judicial recognition of indi-
vidual rights often requires the Court to overturn precedent or invalidate an existing stat-
ute. Federalism issues (Table 9) are also relevant because judicial restraint is traditionally
identified with respect for the role of the states within the federal system.
27. See supra text accompanying note 3; see also category analysis discussion infra part
V.
28. See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 118 S.Ct. 1428, 1440-42 (1998) (holding that Congress'
proof of paternity requirement for citizenship by birth whenever the citizen parent of a
child born out of wedlock abroad is the child's father, as opposed to the mother does not
represent unconstitutional denial of equal protection based on the sex of the citizen
parent).
29. See id.
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rights.3" Therefore, to the extent the Study's basic ideological assump-
tions regarding liberal and conservative outcomes are accurate, it is
possible to identify trends by tracking the voting patterns reflected in
Data Tables 1 through 10.
To reckon current ideological positions within the Court, votes of
the individual Justices can be compared with those cast by other Jus-
tices this Term, as well as with the outcomes for the 1986 through 1996
Terms. Likewise, the current ideological position of the Court as a
whole can be determined by comparing present outcomes for the
Court majority with those of prior Terms. In Data Tables 1-10, this
information appears in the form of voting percentages for each Justice
and for the Court majority. Charts 1-10, in turn, graphically depict the
Court's voting trends revealed in the tables.
Mean Tables 1-10 and Regression Tables 1-10 analyze the voting
patterns of the individual Justices. The purpose of these tables is to
determine whether a Justice's 1997 Term voting record departs in a
statistically significant manner from his or her prior voting pattern and
whether any significant correlation exists among the Term-to-Term
voting patterns of the Justices.3'
Finally, Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 and Frontier Charts 1-4 com-
pare the Justice's conservative and liberal predilections this Term and
over the course of the entire Study. Frontier analysis3' mitigates some
of the analytical difficulties previously discussed by measuring the
strength of each Justice's tendencies relative to the rest of the Court
with respect to the cases actually presented in a given Term rather
than against any absolute scale.
All of these data and statistics must be interpreted with caution.
The percentages and statistical results revealed on each table are af-
fected not only by the dispositions of the individual Justices but also
by the nature of the cases decided each Term. Furthermore, Supreme
Court cases are not the result of random selection, and the universe of
votes cast by the Justices is relatively small. Since both random sam-
ping and large sample size are crucial elements of any fully reliable
statistical analysis, conclusions drawn from this Study are not beyond
30. See, e.g., Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. 921, 926 (1998) (holding
that claim preclusion by reason of a prior federal judgment is a defensive plea that pro-
vides no ground for removal of state law claims based on federal question jurisdiction).
31. See infra Appendix B.
32. See id.
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dispute. There are obvious limitations to any empirical analysis of a
subjective decision making process.3
In light of these caveats, one might ask whether this Study is
worth either conducting or reading. We believe it is. For years, exper-
ienced Supreme Court practitioners have attempted to divine the ide-
ological predilections of individual Justices in framing their arguments
to the Court. Moreover, both the media and academicians are fond of
attaching ideological labels to the Court and its personnel. Supreme
Court practitioners, legal scholars and the public have long assumed
that assessments of Court ideology are valuable-even though such
assessments may be based upon little more than the gut reactions of
the attorneys, scholars, and news reporters involved. This Study,
based upon a systematic methodology for objectively gathering, quan-
tifying and analyzing data over time, should be more reliable than
such ad hoc assessments.
III. Overview of the Ideological Trends of the 1997 Term
The voting behavior of the 1997 Term indicates overall liberal
movement in most categories with the exception of the Criminal Party
versus State Government category, which showed true conservative
movement. This movement, together with the continued uneasy bal-
ance of power in swing-vote cases,34 may signify a retreat from last
Term's somewhat conservative posture. The summarized results of
each category are as follows:
Data Table 1, Civil Party versus State Government - Data Table 1
and Chart 1, which gauge the Justices' voting patterns in civil cases
pitting state governments against private parties, show substantial lib-
eral movement. Every Justice voted less often for the state this Term
than last, and the Court's decisions as a whole favored private liti-
gants 26% more often. Chief Justice Rehnquist continued to vote
33. The general reliability of statistical inference depends on random sampling. See
generally ALLEN T. CRAIG AND ROBERT V. HOGG, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL
STATISTICS 157-58 (1995); RAYMOND H. MYERs, CLASSICAL AND MODERN REGRESSION
wrm APPLICATIONS 9-11 (1990). The Court's method of selecting cases is far from ran-
dom. Rather, it is the result of a conscious decisional process. Reliable statistics generally
require large quantities of information to produce reliable results. As sample sizes become
larger, inferences become more accurate. This Study is subject to sampling bias, both be-
cause the sample is not random and because it is comparatively small. The statistical infer-
ences below, therefore, may not accurately represent a Justice's (or the Court's) views.
34. See infra Data Table 10.
35. See generally, 1996 Study, supra note 1.
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most conservatively of all the Justices in this category, while Justice
Stevens retained his customary position at the liberal end of the Table.
Data Table 2, Civil Party versus Federal Government - Likewise,
Data Table 2 and Chart 2 indicate liberal movement. Seven of the nine
Justices voted less often for the Federal Government this Term than
during the 1996 Term. Justices O'Connor and Scalia were the only
Justices not participating in this liberal shift. Traditionally conserva-
tive Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas each voted less often
for the government this Terms than in any Term previously included
in this study.
Data Table 3, Criminal Party versus State Government - This cate-
gory is the only category indicating any conservative movement this
Term. Every Justice except Justice Ginsburg voted more often for the
state government litigant than in 1996. Although the split decisions
category reflects a drop of over 30 percentage points, in favor of the
criminal defendant, the Court majority voted in favor of the state 80%
of the time in unanimously decided cases, and 71.4% of the time over-
all. By contrast, the predictable Justice Stevens was nearly 20 percent-
age points below the next Justice, voting for the state government only
23.1% of the time.
Data Table 4, Criminal Party versus Federal Government - This
category has historically exhibited a conservative voting pattern in
favor of the government. This pattern remains unchanged this Term,
although a slight liberal trend can be detected. In split cases, the ma-
jority voted for the government 66.7% of the time, down nearly ten
percentage points from last Term. Overall, the majority voted for the
government 80.0% of the time, also down from 1996. However, in
unanimous cases, the Court repeated last Term's result and voted for
the government 100% of the time.
Data Table 5, First Amendment; Data Table 6, Equal Protection -
Both of these categories included very few cases this Term. Only one
First Amendment claim and two Equal Protection claims were ad-
dressed. Accordingly, statistical conclusions are difficult to synthesize.
There are, however, some outcomes worth noting. This Term the
Court continued its conservative trend of disfavoring First Amend-
ment claims. Last Term, the Court voted for such claims a mere 28.6%
of the time, and this Term the single decision addressing the issue re-
jected the claim. On the other hand, Equal Protection showed some
liberal movement with the Court upholding claims 50% of the time,
an increase of 30 percentage points over last Term. One of the two
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Equal Protection Cases, Miller v. Albright, produced an intriguing vot-
ing result based on conflicting standards of scrutiny.
36
Data Table 7, Statutory Civil Rights - Data Table 7 and Chart 7
indicate slight liberal movement in this category with decisions up-
holding claims 61.5% of the time. This figure represents a 4.4% in-
crease over last Term and marks the second highest score ever for this
category. The liberal movement is also indicated by a marked turn-
around in split-decision cases which were decided favorably for claims
62.5% of the time (up 45.8% from last Term). Justice Kennedy, the
Court's most frequent swing voter, mirrored this result, voting 61.5%
in favor of civil rights claims. Interestingly, and notwithstanding the
liberal trend exhibited by the Court's final decisions in this category,
eight of the nine Justices actually voted less often for statutory civil
rights claims this Term than last.
Data Table 8, Jurisdiction - This category reveals minor liberal
movement with the majority voting to assert jurisdiction in 58.6% of
cases in which the issue was addressed. This figure was up 6.4% com-
pared with last Term. Justice Souter voted more often than any other
Justice to assert jurisdiction, replacing Justice Stevens who has held
the Table's top position since 1994.
Data Table 9, Federalism - This category indicates a significant
liberal shift this Term. In fact, every Justice voted less often for the
state this Term than in the 1996 Term, and the percentage of cases
decided in favor of a state litigant dropped to 31.6%-the second low-
est score ever recorded for the category. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, who usually vote 70% or more for the states, voted a
mere 36.8% and 31.6% respectively. Justice Kennedy occupied the
top spot, voting for the states 42.1% of the time. At the other end of
the scale, Justices Souter and Breyer voted for the states in a mere
15.8% of cases. All Justices' except Justice Ginsburg, showed statisti-
cally significant changes to their voting patterns in this category.
Data Table 10, Split Decisions - This Term marked only the third
time in the history of this Study that the "Liberal Coalition" prevailed
more often in split-decision cases than the "Conservative Coalition."
However, the differential between the two "Coalitions" is the narrow-
est in the study at a mere 12.5 percentage points. Justice Kennedy was
predictably the most frequent swing voter, voting with the Majority
87.5% of the time. This was within 0.2% of the prediction for 1997.
Although neither "Coalition" dominated the swing votes, this Term's
36. See infra text accompanying notes 62-65.
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overall liberal movement suggests that the Rehnquist court may be
voting less conservatively.
IV. The 1997 Term Voting Record
This study seeks to quantify several characteristics of Supreme
Court voting behavior by analyzing the Court's voting record. We ex-
amine voting trends, patters, and mean voting percentages both for
individual Justices and for the Court as a whole.37 Subpart A below
explains, in simple fashion, the numerical and statistical tests used in
this Study and their representation in the charts and graphs that fol-
low.38 Subpart B provides a categorical analysis of significant trends
and patters present in the data.
A. The Data
Data Tables 1 through 10 set out the Term-by-Term voting scores
for each Justice, the breakdown of votes contributing to 1997 Term
scores, our predicted 1998 Term scores, the prediction error, and our
predicted scores for the 1997 Term. Scores are simply the percentage
of time a Justice voted in favor of the party or claim indicated in each
table's title. Predictions are based on an ARIMA39 forecasting model.
The bottom three rows of each Data Table contain scores for the
Court as a whole and are broken down into three categories. "Major-
ity all Cases" summarizes the Court's disposition of all decisions in-
volving the indicated party or claim, while "Split Decision" and
"Unanimous" summarize only those decisions reached by a divided or
unanimous Court respectively.
Charts 1 through 10 display, in graphical form, the Court's voting
record in each category over the course of the Study. The "Majority
All Cases" line reveals trends in the Court's disposition of cases within
the indicated category from one Term to the next. The "Split Deci-
sions" line is perhaps more interesting because it includes only those
cases in which Justices disagreed with one another and so may provide
a better indication of the Court's "balance" in each category. The
"Unanimous" line rounds out the information presented by demon-
37. Our ability to analyze newer Justices' voting patterns may be restricted or pre-
cluded in some instances due to insufficient data.
38. For additional information regarding our methods of analysis, see infra Appendix
B.
39. ARIMA stands for AutoRegressive, Integrated Moving-Average. For more infor-
mation on this procedure, see infra Appendix B.
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strating the outcome of cases in which there was no ideological
division.
Mean Tables 1 through 10 set out the mean of all scores recorded
for each Justice during the last ten Terms of this Study (1987-1996).
Also shown are the 99% confidence interval for the true mean, the
standard deviation of the scores, and the 1997 Term scores. The final
column indicates whether 1997 Term scores differ in a statistically sig-
nificant way from the Justice's past mean scores.
Finally, Regression Tables 1 through 10 show Pearson correla-
tions and adjusted r2 statistics relating the Justices' Term-to Term vot-
ing patterns. The r2 statistic is a more reliable indicator of correlation
than the Pearson statistic. A high positive correlation between Justices
does not indicate that they vote together, but rather that their Term-
to-Term scores tend to move in similar directions. In fact, this statistic
may provide more information regarding the nature of the cases de-
cided each Term than it does regarding the Court's voting behavior.
Although some general indications of bloc voting behavior might be
deduced from this information, more reliable information can be
gleaned from our swing vote analysis4" and frontier analysis.4 ' For this
reason, we devote only minimal discussion to the correlation statistic
this Term, but continue to include the data in order to maintain consis-
tency with information provided by the Study in prior Terms.
40. See infra Data Table 10.
41. See infra Part VI and Appendix B.
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B. Analysis
Table 1: Civil-State Party
This Term resulted in a marked decrease in favorable decisions
for state governments, as evidenced by Data Table 1 and Chart 1.42
However, this was not particularly significant as the Court merely
dropped back to historical norms. In fact, none of the Justices' scores
varied to a statistically significant degree from their past voting
records. Although there had been increasing support for state govern-
ments the past three Terms, the Court swung back down and recorded
a record low in the "Split Decisions" category, voting for the state
only 33.3% of the time. This dip in state support is indicative of the
more liberal stance apparent during the 1997 Term.
Individually, all nine Justices voted against the state more often
than last Term. In fact, the ordering of the Justices was identical to
last Term. This liberal result was a bit of a surprise. Only Justice
Scalia voted predictably, finding for the state government in 60% of
the cases. Chief Justice Rehnquist remained the most conservative
Justice in civil cases involving state governments, tying with Justice
Scalia. However, his support declined more than that of any other
Justice this Term, dropping 24.9% compared with last Term.
Statistically predicted voting patterns for 1997 were too liberal for
the most part. Only Justice Scalia's voting behavior was predicted
within 5%. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Souter,
and Stevens all voted more conservatively than predicted, voting for
state governments 17.1%, 14.7%, 15.6%, and 17.6% more often than
predicted, respectively. The only Justices voting more liberally than
predicted were Justices O'Connor and Thomas. Justice O'Connor,
predicted to vote for the state 74.5% of the time for the state, instead
voted that way only 53.3% of the time. Justice Thomas voted for state
governments 17.7% less often than predicted.
As with last Term, the most notable voting correlations in this
category are between Justices Ginsburg and Stevens. This pairing
showed an adjusted r2 statistic of 96%, equaling last Term. This high r2
42. Cases decided in favor of state governments: Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 118 S.Ct. 966
(1998); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (1998); Gebser v. Lago Vista In-
dependent School District, 118 S.Ct. 1989 (1998); Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 118
S.Ct. 1665 (1998); South Dakota v. Yankton Souix Tribe, 118 S.Ct. 789 (1998); Wisconsin
Department of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S.Ct. 2047 (1998). Cases decided against state
governments: Crawford v. Britton, 118 S.Ct. 1584 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998); Foster v. Love, 118 S.Ct. 464 (1998); Lunding v. New York Tax
Appeals Tribunal, 118 S.Ct. 766 (1998); Pa. Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct.
1952 (1998); Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S.Ct. 1925 (1998).
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statistic indicates that this pair's scores vary from one Term to another
in such a way that the score of one Justice may be predicted with a
high degree of accuracy based on the score of the other. Correlation
does not, however, imply causation.
Table 2: Civil-Federal Party
This Term found the Court's support of the federal government in
civil cases continuing to dwindle.43 Seven of the nine Justices voted
less often for the federal government this Term than they did last
Term. The "Majority All Cases" support for the federal government
fell to an unprecedented low of 36.4%. Similarly, "Split" decisions
favored the federal government only in 26.7% of the cases, another
all-time low. In "Unanimous" cases, the Court supported the federal
government only 57.1% of the time, compared to 70% last Term.
Moreover, although decisions opposing a generally liberal administra-
tion might ordinarily be indicative of a conservative rather than liberal
Court, this Term's cases were decided on traditionally liberal grounds,
indicating a truly liberal ideological stance of the Court. For example,
in four decisions, the Court expanded standing, voting in a tradition-
ally liberal manner.' In another, the Court voted to protect jury ver-
dicts-another traditionally liberal outcome.45
Individually, typically liberal Justices Breyer and Stevens voted
the second and third most conservatively, supporting the federal gov-
ernment in 57.1% and 55% of the cases, respectively. Justice
O'Connor recorded her second highest mark ever, voting for the gov-
43. Cases decided in favor of the federal government: Allentown Mack Sales & Ser-
vice, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 118 S.Ct. 818 (1998); Atlantic Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 118 S.Ct. 1413 (1998); City of Chicago v.
International College of Surgeons, 118 S.Ct. 523 (1998); Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing
Technologies, 118 S.Ct. 1700 (1998); LaChance v. Erickson, 118 S.Ct. 753 (1998); National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S.Ct. 2168 (1998); Regions Hospital v. Shalala, 118
S.Ct. 909 (1998); United States v. Beggerly, 118 S.Ct. 1862 (1998); United States v.
Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. 1876 (1998). Cases decided against the federal government: Allen-
town Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 118 S.Ct. 818 (1998);
California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1464 (1998); Clinton v. City of New York,
118 S.Ct. 2091 (1998); Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 118 S.Ct. 2131 (1998); FEC v. Atkins, 118
S.Ct. 1777 (1998); Forney v. Apfel, 118 S.Ct. 1984 (1998); National Credit Union Ass'n v.
First Nat'l Bank and Trust, 118 S.Ct. 927 (1998); Hetzel v. Prince William County, Va., 118
S.Ct. 1210 (1998); Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S.Ct. 502 (1998); Miller v. Albright, 118 S.Ct.
1428 (1998); United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. 1290 (1998).
44. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (1998); Eastern Enter. v.
Apfel, 118 S.Ct. 2131 (1998); FEC v. Atkins, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (1998); Forney v. Apfel, 118
S.Ct. 1984 (1998); National Credit Union Ass'n v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust, 118 S.Ct. 927
(1998).
45. See Hetzel v. Prince William County, Va., 118 S.Ct. 1210 (1998).
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ernment 61.9% of the time. Conversely, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Thomas and Kennedy recorded their lowest scores ever, vot-
ing for the federal government in 38.1%, 33.3%, and 45.5% of the
cases, respectively. Chief Justice Rehnquist's support for the govern-
ment declined the most this Term, falling from last Term's second
place position at 69.6% all the way to the second to last this Term with
a 38.1% score.
Justice Scalia was the only Justice to exhibit predictable voting
behavior, voting for the federal government in 52.4% of the cases.
With the exception of Justices Scalia and O'Connor, all of the predic-
tions for this Term were too conservative. There were no particularly
noteworthy correlations this Term. Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy
had the highest voting correlation with an adjusted r2 statistic of 92%.
Table 3: State Criminal Cases
The support for states in criminal cases continued to increase, ris-
ing by the second largest margin since the 1992 Term.46 In fact, as
Data Table 3 and Chart 3 show, this category served as the only truly
conservative indicator in the entire study, with the Court voting for
the states in the "Majority All Cases" category 71.4% of the time.
This score marked the second highest total ever, only eclipsed by the
1992 score of 77.3%. Similarly, in "Unanimous" decisions, the Court
voted as a whole for the states a record 80% of the time, increasing
46.7% from the previous Term. However, in "Split" decisions, there
was a liberal movement, with results favoring the states in only 66.7%
of the cases, compared to 100% last Term.
A moderately conservative trend was evidenced by the increase
of every Justices' score, except Justice Ginsburg's, in favor of the
states. Even though Justice Thomas reclaimed the top position, he
needed an increase in state support of over 29% to do so. In addition,
Justice Scalia's second position score was his second highest ever at
84.6%. Justice Kennedy's support for states in criminal cases similarly
increased from 54.6% last Term to 76.9% this Term, placing him in
third position. Justice Stevens continued to vote predictably, support-
46. Cases decided in favor of the states: Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998);
Buchanan v. Angelone, 118 S.Ct. 757 (1998); Calderon v. Thompson, 118 S.Ct. 1489 (1998);
Hopkins v. Reeves, 118 S.Ct. 1895 (1998); Monge v. California, 118 S.Ct. 2246 (1998); New
Mexico v. Reed, 118 S.Ct. 1860 (1998); Ohio Adult Parol Authority v. Woodard, 118 S.Ct.
1244 (1998); Spencer v. Kemna, 118 S.Ct. 978 (1998); United States v. Ramirez, 118 S.Ct.
992 (1998). Cases decided against the states: Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S.Ct. 1489 (1998);
Woodard, 118 S.Ct. 1244; Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 118 S.Ct. 1618 (1998); Trest v.
Cain, 118 S.Ct. 478 (1998).
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ing the states in only 23.1% of the cases. This behavior varied from
his predicted score by only 0.07%. Chief Justice Rehnquist was also
quite predictable with his score varying only 4.1% from our predic-
tion. In what proved to be a traditionally liberal Term, the criminal
state cases category stood alone among all the categories in indicating
conservative movement by the Court.
Table 4: Federal Criminal Cases
Data Table 4 and Chart 4 demonstrate the Court's continuing
support for the federal government in criminal cases.47 In the "Unani-
mous" category, the Court voted for the federal government 100% of
the time. This score was matched only by last year's equally conserva-
tive score. However, despite this conservative indication, the "Major-
ity All Cases" and "Split" decision categories show a more liberal
trend away from governmental support, with declining scores of 80%
and 66.7%, respectively. Therefore, despite overall conservative
scores, a slightly liberal trend may be detected.
Justice Kennedy recorded his highest score ever for this category,
supporting the federal government in criminal cases 90% of the time,
compared to 84.6% last Term. Similarly, Justice Thomas recorded his
highest mark ever, also voting for the federal government in 90% of
the cases. Despite the typically standard orientation with the liberal
Justices grouped at the bottom, Chief Justice Rehnquist fell to fourth
position, with a 70% score, his second lowest ever. Of particular in-
terest is the fact that two of the three top positions are occupied by
the two most frequent swing voters on the Court, Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor.48
Chief Justice Rehnquist's voting behavior was the most predict-
able this Term. His score of 70% varied from his predicted score by
only 1.9%. Likewise, Justice O'Connor's predicted score was accu-
rate, varying from her actual score by only 4.9%. No voting correla-
tions were particularly noteworthy this Term; yet, Justices Souter and
Ginsburg's adjusted r statistic was the most correlated for the fifth
consecutive Term with a score of 82%.
47. Cases decided in favor of the federal government: Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 118 S.Ct. 1219 (1998); Bates v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 285 (1998); Brogan v. United
States, 118 S.Ct. 805 (1997); Bryan v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1939 (1998); Hudson v.
United States, 118 S.Ct. 488 (1997); Salinas v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 469 (1997); United
States v. Scheffer, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (1998); Edwards v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1475 (1998).
Cases decided against the federal government: Bousley v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1604
(1998); Lewis v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1135 (1998).
48. See supra Table 10 discussion.
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Table 5: First Amendment
This Term, the Court decided only one case that touched on a
First Amendment issue.49 This lone data point makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to draw any conclusions regarding ideological positions or
trends in this category. Therefore, this year's First Amendment voting
behavior might best be analyzed by considering it in conjunction with
last Term's decisions.
Last Term we concluded that the "First Amendment faired
poorly." 50 This statement continues to ring true. This Term, the Court
weighed the constitutionality of a 1990 Congressional amendment to
the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act that di-
rected the Chairperson of the National Endowment for the Arts to
consider "decency" in selecting federal art grant recipients.5' The 1990
amendment was challenged on First Amendment grounds as being un-
constitutionally vague and viewpoint based.52 Reversing the Ninth
Circuit, Justice O'Connor determined that the amendment was not
unconstitutional and did not, "on its face, impermissibly infringe on
First [Amendment] rights."' 53 Justice Souter, writing a lengthy opinion
arguing in favor of the First Amendment claim, was the lone
dissenter. 4
Several statistical outcomes may be worth noting. First the Court
reached a nearly unanimous decision, with only Justice Souter dissent-
ing. Full unanimity has evaded the Court on First Amendment issues
since 1996.11 Second, despite the scarcity of First Amendment cases
this Term, the Court did continue its conservative trend, begun in
1995, of disfavoring First Amendment claims.56 Finally, Data Table 5
49. The only case decided was NEA v. Finley, 118 S.Ct. 2168 (1998).
50. Wilkins, et al., supra note 1, at 91.
51. See NEA v. Finley, 118 S.Ct. 2168 (1998).
52. See id. at 2174.
53. Id. at 2180.
54. See id. at 2185-96 (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter argued that the constitutional
principle which prohibits government suppression of ideas "simply because society find the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable" applies not only to "affirmative suppression of speech,
but also to disqualification for government favors... ."Id. at 2185; cf. id at 2183 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[i]t is preposterous to equate the denial of taxpayer subsidy with measures
'aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas"') (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Repre-
sentation of Wash., 103 S.Ct. 1997 (1983), in turn quoting Cammarano v. United States, 79
S.Ct. 524, 533 (1959), in turn quoting Speiser v. Randall, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1338 (1958)).
55. See supra Chart 5 (the last time the Court unanimously decided a First Amend-
ment issue was in the 1995 Term).
56. See supra Chart 5 (noting that 1995 marked the Court's conservative shift from
favoring First Amendment claims (liberal), which began in 1990, to disfavoring First
Amendment claims (conservative) which has been the trend since 1995).
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forecasts a continued decline in support for First Amendment
claims 5 7 with a predicted 1998 Term score of only about 10%-an all-
time low for this Study.
Table 6: Equal Protection
The Court decided only two cases which touched on equal protec-
tion issues this Term. 8 As a result, the statistical problems previously
described with respect to First Amendment cases this Term are also
present in this category.59 However, taken at face value, Data Table 6
and Chart 6 indicate slight liberal movement this Term.
In Campbell v. Louisiana, the Court exhibited a fairly predictable
voting pattern, with two of the most conservative Justices, Justices
Scalia and Thomas, casting the only votes against the equal protection
claim.60 On the other hand, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who in two prior
Terms failed to cast a single vote in favor of an equal protection
claim,6' voted for the claim in Campbell v. Louisiana.
In Miller v. Albright, the Court divided into largely traditional
voting alliances, but in an unusual manner.62 The Justices applied two
different levels of scrutiny to the equal protection claim presented.
63
Among the Justices applying heightened scrutiny, a "plurality" com-
posed of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter voted in favor of the
claim, while Justices Rehnquist and (somewhat surprisingly) Stevens
cast conservative votes against the claim. The tables turned, however
when Justices Kennedy and O'Connor voted conservatively against
the equal protection claim, applying rational basis scrutiny. The net
result' is that the equal protection claim lost, but on two different
rationales, pursuant to two levels of scrutiny. This is perhaps most ef-
57. See supra Data Table 5 (majority votes for First Amendment claims is predicted to
be a mere 9.9%).
58. See Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S.Ct. 1419 (1998); Miller v. Albright, 118 S.Ct. 1428
(1998).
59. See supra note 11.
60. Campbell v. Lousiana, 118 S.Ct. 1419, 1426 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part,
joined by Scalia, J.).
61. See supra Data Table 6 (noting that in 1996 and in 1993, Chief Justice Rehnquist
did not cast any votes in favor of an equal protection claim the Court decided, and in 1993
the Chief Justice was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas in not casting any votes for
equal protection claims).
62. Miller v. Albright, 118 S.Ct. 1428 (1998).
63. Five Justices (Rehnquist, Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer) applied height-
ened scrutiny. Two Justices (Kennedy and O'Connor) applied rational basis scrutiny. Id.
64. The "net result" here assumes that the two rationales are combined and looks to
the overall outcome of the equal protection claims.
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fectively illustrated by the following chart recording the Justices'
votes:
Equal Protection Votes in Miller v. Albright
Justice For Claim Against Claim
Breyer heightened scrutiny
Ginsburg heightened scrutiny
Kennedy rational basis scrutiny






Note that Justices Scalia and Thomas did not address the equal
protection issue presented in this case.65 Nevertheless, as illustrated
by the chart above, more votes were cast against Equal Protection
issue than for it. For purposes of this Study, this result translates into
the conservative "majority" vote against equal protection reflected in
Data Table 6.66 However, the question remains whether a majority of
the Court reached a single decision contrary to the equal protection
claim presented because this outcome depends on two different ratio-
nales spawned by two different levels of scrutiny.
Data Table 6 and Regression Table 6 indicate some interesting
relationships. First, Data Table 6 shows that three traditionally liberal
Justices-Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter-have posted identical scores
on equal protection issues since 1994.67 This is mirrored on the con-
servative side by Justices Scalia and Thomas who, with one minor ex-
ception,68 have scored identically on equal protection issues since
65. Justices Scalia and Thomas did reach various other issues which touched on the
Civil, Federal Party and Jurisdiction categories of this study. See id.
66. See specifically where the "Majority" row and the "1997 Term Votes" column
meet in Data Table 6, which indicates that the Court majority voted once for equal protec-
tion and once against it. The Majority vote for the equal protection claim was in Campbell
v. Louisiana, 118 S.Ct. 1419 (1998), and the majority vote against the claim was in Miller,
118 S.Ct. 1428.
67. See supra Data Table 6. Justices Ginsburg and Souter have voted identically since
1993.
68. In 1995, Justice Scalia voted for equal protection claims 40% of the time while
Justice Thomas voted for the claims 50% of the time. See id.
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1992.69 Regression Table 6 confirms these relationships. Such per-
fectly correlated voting patterns are found in only one other Regres-
sion Table.7"
Another noteworthy statistic is the Court's prolonged inability to
reach a unanimous decision on equal protection issues. As indicated
by Chart 6, the last time the Court unanimously decided an equal pro-
tection issue was in 1991.71
Data Table 6 also indicates that the study's 1997 prediction for
Majority votes in favor of equal protection claims was 23.8 percentage
points in error.7 2 This large error may be mostly explained by the lack
of equal protection cases this Term (where each claim represents 50
percentage points).73 The 1998 prediction for the Majority, 62.5% in
favor of equal protection claims, still reflects the Court's overall ten-
dency to decide these cases liberally.74 This Term indicates a slight
retraction from that trend.
Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights
Data Table 7 indicates moderate liberal movement in this cate-
gory, which is harmonious with the Court's overall liberal trend since
1993.75 The Majority decided 61.5% of all issues in favor of the statu-
tory civil rights claims.76 This liberal movement is supported by the
Court's favorable outcome in 62.5% of the split decisions (up 45.8 per-
centage points from last Term).77 Ideology is presumably more rele-
vant in cases involving split decisions, making this considerable jump
significant. This result also marks a considerable turnaround from the
69. See id.
70. See supra Regression Table 7 (indicating that Justices Stevens' and Breyer's voting
patterns are perfectly correlated from Term to Term).
71. See supra Chart 6.
72. Supra Data Table 6.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Supra Data Table 7.
76. Cases decided in favor of statutory civil rights claims: Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S.Ct.
2196 (1998); Crawford v. Britton, 118 S.Ct. 1584 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998); Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S.Ct. 502 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Off-
shore Serv., Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998 (1998); Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 838
(1998); and Pa. Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. 1952 (1998). Cases decided
against statutory civil rights claims: Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 118 S.Ct. 966 (1998); County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (1998); Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind't Sch. District, 118
S.Ct. 1989 (1998); and City of Monroe v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 400 (1997).
77. See supra Data Table 7.
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Court's largely conservative posture in split decision cases since
1990.78
All of the Justices, save Justice Kennedy, dropped percentage
points compared with last Term.79 The drop among conservative Jus-
tices was considerably greater than it was among the liberal Justices.
For example, three traditionally liberal Justices-Stevens, Breyer, and
Ginsburg- dropped collectively only 3.9 percentage points.80 So
slight is this drop that it does not indicate any significant movement
among the liberal Justices. In contrast the four traditionally conserva-
tive Justices-Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas-each
individually dropped more than 22 percentage points.8 1 This seems to
indicate a significant conservative movement among the conservative
Justices of the Court. This result is also reflected in Mean Table 7
which indicates statistically significant voting movement among Jus-
tices Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Scalia. 2 Nevertheless, this conserva-
tive shift among conservative Court members ultimately proved
inadequate to restrain the Court's overall liberal movement in this
category.
Also noteworthy are several correlations in Term-to-Term voting
scores among Justices at each end of the liberal/conservative spec-
trum. On the liberal side, Justices Stevens and Breyer showed identi-
cal voting percentages this Term as they have since 1994 when Justice
Breyer joined the Court. 3 While this statistic does not indicate that
the two Justices have voted exactly the same on every issue, a review
of this Term's decisions indicates that they were on different sides of
the controversy in only one of the eleven cases included in the Statu-
tory Civil Rights category. 4 On the conservative side, Justices Scalia
78. See id. (indicating that the Court has only been on the liberal side of split decision




82. Supra Mean Table 7.
83. Supra Data Table 7.
84. See City of Monroe, 118 S.Ct. 400 (Justice Breyer voting for the claim and Justice
Stevens voting against the claim). While at first, this might indicate an error in voting tabu-
lation, this apparent discrepancy can be resolved. Justice Stevens, in Jefferson v. City of
Tarrant, Ala., 118 S.Ct. 481, 487-88 (1998), was the only Justice to reach the merits of the
statutory civil rights claim and opined in favor of the claim. This gave Justice Stevens his
"eleventh" vote in favor of statutory civil rights claims. Because a majority of Justices did
not reach the merits of the claim, Jefferson was not included among statutory civil rights
cases. Furthermore, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (1998), every Justice
but Justice Stevens reached the statutory civil rights issue and decided the case against the
claim. Thus Justice Stevens did not accrue his "third" vote against statutory civil rights
SPRING 1999] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 1997 TERM 593
and Thomas likewise show matching voting percentages this Term as
they have since 1992.85 Again, this statistic alone does not indicate
that the two Justices voted the same on every issue. However, unlike
Justices Stevens and Breyer, a review of the decisions reveals that in-
deed Justices Scalia and Thomas voted identically on every statutory
civil rights issue this Term, and in one case were even the lone con-
servative voices voting against the claim.8 6
Predictions proved remarkably accurate for three Justices this
Term. Justice Stevens' prediction was within 3.2 percentage points .
7
Even more accurate were our predictions for Justices O'Connor and
Thomas's which came within 0.1 and 2.7 percentage points respec-
tively.8" However, the prediction for the Majority was 30.4 percentage
points in error. Thus, predictions for the Court's liberal or conserva-
tive movement as a whole continues to be difficult to ascertain in this
category.
Table & Jurisdiction
The Majority decided 58.6% of all jurisdiction claims in favor of
the claim this Term, which is fairly close to par for the past decade.8 9
Perhaps the most significant change with respect to the Court's deci-
sions this Term was the 44.7% increase in its split decisions.90 Though
Data Table 8 shows that the Court tends to shift radically with respect
claims. The ultimate result was that Justices Stevens and Breyer's percentages and votes
both for and against statutory civil rights claims are identical.
85. See supra Data Table 7.
86. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting
with Scalia, J., joining).
87. See supra Data Table 7.
88. Id.
89. Cases decided in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction: Air Line Pilots Ass'n. v.
Miller, 118 S.Ct. 1761 (1998); Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998); California v. Deep
Sea Research, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1464 (1998); Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S.Ct. 1419 (1998);
City of Chicago v. Int'l College of Surgeons, 118 S.Ct. 523 (1998); Clinton v. City of New
York, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (1998); FEC v. Akins, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (1998); Forney v. Apfel, 118
S.Ct. 1984 (1998); Hohn v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1969 (1998); Hudson v. United States,
118 S.Ct. 488 (1998); Miller v. Albright, 118 S.Ct. 1428 (1998); National Credit Union Ass'n
v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust, 118 S.Ct. 927 (1998); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 118 S.Ct.
1618 (1998); and Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S.Ct. 2047 (1998). Cases
decided against the exercise of jurisdiction: Calderon v. Ashmus, 118 S.Ct. 1694 (1998);
Calderon v. Thompson, 118 S.Ct. 1489 (1998); Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 118 S.Ct. 481
(1998); Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S.Ct. 956 (1998);
Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 118 S.Ct. 921 (1998); Rivet v. Regional Bank of Louisi-
ana, 118 S.Ct. 921 (1998); Rogers v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 673 (1998); Spencer v. Kemna,
118 S.Ct. 978 (1998); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (1998); Textron
v. UAW, 118 S.Ct. 1626 (1998); and United States v. Beggerly, 118 S.Ct. 1862 (1998).
90. See supra Data Table 8.
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to split decisions in this category,91 this Term marks the Study's high-
est score ever in split decisions favoring the exercise of jurisdiction. 92
Worth noting is the relatively large sample of cases this category
provides. In fact, at twenty-five cases this Term, the Jurisdiction cate-
gory provides a larger sample than any other category. The benefit of
a large pool is two-fold. First, because the sample is large, it is more
likely that the Study's statistics will accurately reflect the trends in the
Justices' and the Court's voting behavior. Second, a large sampling
improves the accuracy of our predictions for future behavior.
The Court's minimal movement as a whole mirrors the Justices'
individual movement. However, Mean Table 8 indicates Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Stephens' voting behavior significantly deviated
from their previous averages. 93 Chief Justice Rehnquist only moved
3.5 percentage points from last Term;94 however his score was his sec-
ond highest ever recorded by the Study. In contrast, Justice Stevens
dropped 17.9% from last year's position as the Justice most favorably
disposed to exercise jurisdiction to this Term's middle of the road
position.
Regression Table 8 indicates several Justices whose Term-to-Term
voting movement is correlated.95 As previously explained, this table
does not measure how often Justice's decide issues in an identical
manner. Rather, it measures correlation in the movement of the Jus-
tices' Term-to-Term scores. Justices O'Connor and Scalia have an r2
correlation of 0.95.96 Justices Ginsburg and Souter have an r2 correla-
tion of 0.93.
Predictions in this category are the most accurate of any in the
Study. No prediction varied more than 17 percentage points from the
actual outcome.98 Furthermore, predictions for four Justices were
91. See id. (indicating five 20 percentage point or more changes in split decision cases
since 1988 (1998 to 1989, 1990 to 1991, 1991 to 1992, 1993 to 1994, and 1996 to 1997)).
92. See id.
93. See supra Mean Table 8.
94. See supra Data Table 8.
95. See supra Regression Table 8.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. The Criminal Federal Cases category came close with its largest deviation
from the prediction being 17.5 points. See supra Data Table 4. However, this category did
succeed in this Term's most accurate prediction for Majority behavior deviating a mere 4.8
percentage points from the Majority's actual voting behavior. See id. Surprisingly, the
Criminal Federal Cases category had a comparatively small sampling of only ten cases. See
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within 5.1%, 99 and the prediction for the Majority score varied only
7.2% from the true outcome.
Table 9: Federalism
In contrast to the 1996 Term, Data Table 9 and Chart 9 this Term
demonstrate a significant, Court-wide liberal shift on federalism is-
sues."° Every Justice this Term voted more often for the United
States than last Term. °1 In fact, four Justices- Justices Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Breyer, and Souter-reached all-time lows for votes in
favor of State.'0 2 Even this Term's most conservative score, posted by
Justice Kennedy, was more liberal (in favor of the United States), than
last Term's most liberal score.10 3 Also, the Justices' positions collec-
tively declined dramatically. In all types of cases-majority, split, and
unanimous-the Court voted more liberally than it has since 1991.14
Mean Table 9 indicates that every Justice save Justice Ginsburg
demonstrated a statistically significant liberal shift compared with his
or her prior voting average. 0 5 The most dramatic shifts were effected
by Justice O'Connor Chief Justice Rehnquist who dropped 41.3% and
38.8% respectively from last Term.1
0 6
This Term's significant liberal shift also resulted in a new non-
tradition voting alliance. Last Term, the five traditionally most con-
servative Justices were at the top of the chart indicating their con-
servative stances on federalism issues.' 7 Since 1994, these five
Justices have consistently dominated the top five conservative posi-
99. See supra Data Table 8.
100. Cases decided in favor of the states: Baker v. General Motors, 118 S.Ct. 657
(1998); Buchanan v. Angelone, 118 S.Ct. 757 (1998); Calderon v. Thompson, 118 S.Ct. 1489
(1998); City of Monroe v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 400 (1997); Montana v. Crow Tribe of
Indians, 118 S.Ct. 1650 (1998); and South Dakota v. Yankton Souix Tribe, 118 S.Ct. 789
(1998). Cases decided in favor of the United States: AT&T v. Central Office Tel., Inc., 118
S.Ct. 1956 (1998); California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1464 (1998); City of
Chicago v. Int'l College of Surgeons, 118 S.Ct. 523 (1998); Fidelity Fn. Services, Inc. v.
Fink, 118 S.Ct. 651 (1998); Foster v. Love, 118 S.Ct. 464 (1998); Kalina v. Fletcher, 118
S.Ct. 502 (1998); Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., 118 S.Ct. 1700 (1998); Lewis v. United States,
118 S.Ct. 1135 (1998); Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 118 S.Ct. 766 (1998);
Pa. Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. 1952; and Trest v. Cain, 118 S.Ct. 478
(1997).




105. See supra Mean Table 9 (revealing Justice Ginsburg as the only Justice whose vot-
ing behavior did not statistically deviate from previous norms).
106. See supra Data Table 9.
107. See Wilkins, et al., supra note 1, at 78.
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tions.'08 However, this Term, two traditionally liberal Justices, Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg, rose into the fifth and third positions respec-
tively. This movement might be explained in part by the Court's over-
all shift toward the liberal pole. In fact, Data Table 9 reveals that
when the Court is moving conservatively on federalism issues, 0 9 the
traditionally conservative Justices occupy the top conservative spots.
In contrast, when the court moves liberally,1 0 at least a few tradition-
ally liberal Justices occupy the top conservative slots of the Data
Table.
Regression Table 9 indicates some high correlations among some
rather ideologically diverse Justices. Justices Breyer and Kennedy
have a r2 correlation of .92 and Justices Breyer and O'Connor have a
r2 correlation of .93.111
The rather erratic voting behavior in this category has made pre-
dicting outcomes difficult both for the Court as a whole and for the
individual Justices. The prediction most closely approaching the ac-
tual 1997 outcome was for Justice Stevens with an error of 8.3 percent-
age points. 112 Justice Kennedy's prediction was in error by only 9.3
percentage points" 3 However, Last Term predictions for four Justices
and for the Majority in all cases were not available
Table 10: Swing Votes
Data Table 10 and Chart 10 indicate the voting scores for the
eleven cases that were decided by a margin of one vote. 1 14 Last
Term's swing vote scores (56.3% conservative, 43.7% liberal) have
been identically duplicated this Term, but in reversed positions. The
108. See supra Data Table 9.
109. Data Table 9 shows conservative movement by the Court from 1991 to 1992 (all
cases), 1993 to 1994 (unanimous cases), 1994 to 1995 (split cases), and 1995 to 1996 (unani-
mous cases).
110. Data Table 9 shows liberal movement by the Court from 1990 to 1991 (all cases)




114. Swing-vote cases reaching a conservative outcome: Allentown Mack Sales & Ser-
vice, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S.Ct. 818 (1998); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S.Ct.
1219 (1998); Calderon v. Thompson, 118 S.Ct. 1489 (1998); Gebser v. Lago Vista Independ-
ent School District, 118 S.Ct. 1989 (1998); Monge v. California, 118 S.Ct. 2246 (1998); Ohio
Adult Parol Auth. v. Woodard, 118 S.Ct. 1244 (1998). Swing-vote cases reaching a liberal
outcome: Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S.Ct. 818 (1998); Bragdon v.
Abbott, 118 S.Ct. 2196 (1998); Crawford v. Britton, 118 S.Ct. 1584 (1998); Eastern Enter-
prises v. Apfel, 118 S.Ct. 2131 (1998); National Credit Union Ass'n v. First Nat'l Bank &
Trust, 118 S.Ct. 927 (1998); Ohio Adult Parol Auth. v. Woodard, 118 S.Ct. 1244 (1998);
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 118 S.Ct. 1925 (1998).
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12.4% differential between the scores remains the closest recorded in
this Study, with the "Liberal Coalition" collecting the crucial fifth vote
to "out-swing" the "Conservative Coalition" more often than not.
This Term marked only the third time in the history of the Study that
the "Liberal Coalition" prevailed more often in closely decided cases.
As predicted, Justice Kennedy is the Court's most influential
swing voter for the fifth straight year, voting with the majority a rec-
ord high 87.5% of the time. In fact, the swing-vote majority was only
able to gather the crucial fifth vote in two of the swing cases without
the vote of Justice Kennedy. Justice O'Connor fell from her typical
second place position, voting with the majority only 53.3% of the
time, compared to 75% last Term. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg tied
for the third position, voting with the majority 56.3% of the time and
marking all-time high scores for each of them. The most notable vot-
ing correlations in this category are between Justice Breyer and Chief
Justice Rehnquist. This pairing shows an adjusted r statistic of 99%.
The correlation is actually an inverse one, meaning that as one partici-
pates in more swing coalitions, the other participates less.
This Term marked another year in which neither coalition pos-
sessed marked power (deciding a clear majority of the swing-vote
cases). However, the unsteady and apparently diminishing power of
conservative coalitions suggests that the Rehnquist Court will con-
tinue to become less conservative.
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V. Category Analysis
Beginning last Term, we began to analyze the effectiveness of this
Study's categories in measuring liberal and conservative tendencies
and trends. As might be expected, some categories turn out to be
better indicators than others of the Court's collective and individual
predilections with respect to these metrics.
Some categories, although tending to divide the Court into lib-
eral/conservative blocs, may "change polarity," depending on the spe-
cific issues presented. For example, last Term's First Amendment
scores placed Justices Scalia and Thomas at the top-a liberal position
under this Study's definitions, and a position not commonly occupied
by these particular Justices. Conversely, Justice Breyer held the bot-
tom spot last Term. Other categories tend to be implicated in very
few cases. The small sample results in highly volatile score move-
ments from Term to Term because a single case may account for many
percentage points. This point is dramatically illustrated this Term in
the First Amendment category. Because only one First Amendment
issue was decided, each Justice scored either 0% or 100% in the
category!
In order to determine which categories best differentiate between
more liberal and more conservative Justices, we have applied factor
analysis.115 By applying this method, we have determined that a pri-
mary factor may be extracted from the Study's categories that ac-
counts for over 37% of the variance revealed by the data on Tables 1
through 9.116 We interpret this factor as liberal/conservative bias be-
cause that is what this Study purports to measure. The categories cur-
rently load onto this primary factor as follows:
115. For more information regarding factor analysis, see Appendix B.
116. We employed a QMAX rotation to achieve this result.
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Category Factor 1
Criminal/State Party 0.864










According to this ranking, the Criminal/State Party category ap-
pears to be our best differentiator of liberal/conservative leanings,
while Equal Protection is our poorest. A look at the data seems to
confirm this result.
Equal Protection Claims are relatively rare and produce volatile
results.1 7 Civil/Federal Party case scores, moreover, tend to switch
poles as executive administrations change. Liberal administrations
will bring different types of cases before the Court than will conserva-
tive administrations and will garner the support of different Justices.
For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist's average score was 74% under
Republican administrations, but has fallen to 61% since President
Clinton took office." 8 On the other hand, Justice Stevens averaged
48% under the Republicans and 59% under President Clinton." 9
First Amendment cases also tend toward pole swapping. For example,
if last Term's free speech issues had concerned flag burning rather
than abortion clinic demonstrations and government regulation, the
scores might have been nearly reversed. 2 °
Category analysis, in short, suggests that the most reliable indica-
tor of actual ideology is the data collected on Table 3 (criminal/state
party), with Tables 7 (statutory civil rights), 1 (state civil actions), 8
(jurisdiction), and 4 (Federal criminal cases) providing the next most
reliable data. Tables 9 (federalism), 5 (First Amendment), 2 (federal
civil actions) and 6 (equal protection) provide the least reliable
information.
117. See supra Chart 6.
118. See supra Data Table 2.
119. See also discussion of Table 2, above.
120. See supra 1996 Study, note 1 at 91.
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VI. Frontier Analysis
Attempting to quantify the magnitude of a Justice's liberal or
conservative tendencies and to identify trends in such tendencies over
time is challenging for a variety of reasons. One challenge already
discussed is that of choosing appropriate tests and assessing their va-
lidity. Another is dealing with inconsistency in the nature of cases
appealed to the Court from one Term to the next and the Court's
selection of which questions it will decide. With varying parameters
such as these, is there any meaningful way to quantify, analyze and
compare the Justices' inclinations? One potentially useful method is
frontier analysis.12'
Frontier analysis focuses on the Justices' relative scores rather
than their absolute scores. Boundaries or "frontiers" are defined by
the highest and lowest scores in each category and each combination
of categories. Each Justice is then evaluated relative to the estab-
lished frontier. Moreover, by adjusting the relative weights allocated
to each category, the frontier can be adjusted to reflect each cate-
gory's effectiveness as determined by factor analysis.
We present liberal and conservative frontier data for the Court in
Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 below. Two versions of each frontier are
presented. In Tables 1 and 2 we constrain the weights applied to each
category according to the factor analysis hierarchy described above.'2
In other words, each Justice is allowed to "choose" the weights that
produce the highest frontier score for him or her, subject to the limita-
tion that Statutory Civil Rights cannot receive more weight than
Criminal/State, Civil/State cannot receive more weight than Statutory
Civil Rights, and so forth. Tables 3 and 4 apply no weighting con-
straints at all, allowing each Justice to "choose" those weights that
present him or her in the most conservative or liberal light possible.
Each table lists a "% of Frontier" score for each Justice. Those with a
score of 100% reach the frontier by employing the category weight
distribution shown in the category columns. Scores less than 100%
indicate that the most conservative/liberal score the Justice could ob-
tain with optimal weighting places him or her the indicated percentage
of the way toward the frontier. In some cases, an optimal combina-
tion of weights may even place a justice beyond the frontier. This
condition is known as "superefficiency" and is noted in the charts
when present.
121. For more information regarding frontier analysis, see supra Appendix B.
122. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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Frontier Charts 1 and 2 show the constrained scores of each Jus-
tice over the course of this Study in graphical form. Near the bottom
of each chart is an indication of new Justices replacing outgoing Jus-
tices on the Court. Although former Justices' scores are not indicated,
they contributed to frontier determination during Terms in which they
sat on the Court.
Frontier Charts 3 and 4 show each Justice's range of frontier
scores during the course of this Study. They are easier to read than
the line graphs and give a clearer picture of the Justice's relative posi-
tions and score ranges overall. They do not, however, show any trend
information.
The Charts reveal several interesting trends. Frontier Chart 1
shows Justice Thomas making a superefficient conservative "splash"
during his first Term on the Court, then settling in around the frontier
thereafter. Frontier Chart 2 shows clear and growing domination of
the liberal frontier by Justice Stevens. This chart also provides evi-
dence that Justice Souter's reputation as the "Stealth Justice" is prob-
ably justified."2 Beginning his tenure on the Court in 1990 with a
liberal frontier score of just 53%, Justice Souter has subsequently reg-
istered scores of 74%, 79%, 88%, 96%, and 100% prior to backing off
to 85% in the 1997 Term. His 1998 Term score indicates 147%
superefficiency!
124
Frontier Chart 3 shows that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas have all reached the con-
servative frontier at some point during the Study. In fact, the Chief
Justice never dropped below it until this Term, i.e., he has demon-
strated conservative super-efficiency each Term until this one. Fron-
tier Chart 4 clearly displays Justice Stevens' super-efficient liberal
tendencies. In fact, he so dominates the liberal frontier that only two
other Justices, Breyer and Souter have managed to touch the frontier.
Justice Ginsburg is alone in reaching neither the liberal nor the con-
servative frontiers during her five Terms on the Court.
123. See, e.g., Dick Lehr, A Step Toward the Left: Souter's Surprise Shift May Alter the
Court, BOSTON GLOBE, July 1, 1993, at All. The article stated: "In his first term, he wrote
so little he was nicknamed the 'stealth justice.' Last term, he was lumped into a trio of
moderate conservatives. Now, in the term just ended, Supreme Court Justice David Souter
is the surprise of most high-court prognosticators for displaying increasingly liberal tenden-
cies." Id.
124. See infra Frontier Analysis, Table 2. This superefficiency is due in large part to
Justice Souter's lone vote in favor of the only First Amendment issue decided by the Court
this Term.
610 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26:533
VII. Conclusion
The 1997 Term exhibits the Court's increasing inclination to vote
liberally on ideologically divided issues. Strengthening this conclusion
is the Court's almost across-the-board liberal shift in split cases (cases
where there is at least one dissenter). Furthermore, in swing-vote
cases, which is perhaps the most reliable indicator of the Court's pos-
ture-with Justice Kennedy playing the key role-the Court predomi-
nately favored liberal outcomes. With the possible exception of the
State Criminal Cases category, this Term's voting behavior could be
considered a continuation of last year's consolidation of the Court's
conservatism with the Court conservatives voting much less conserva-
tively and the liberal Justices maintaining their positions. With this
tension as a backdrop, the Court experienced a resurgence of the
once-dormant jurisdiction and federalism issues. The liberal outcomes
prevailing in both these categories further evidences the Court's grow-
ing liberal stance and fading conservative allegiance. With last Term's
apparent ripeness for a conservative-court change,"2 this Term is yet
another indicator that perhaps this shift towards a primarily liberal
balance-of-power is already well underway.
125. See 1996 Study, supra note 1, at 108.
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APPENDIX A
1. The Universe of Cases
The only cases included in the database are those 1997 Term
cases decided by full opinion. Decisions on motions have been ex-
cluded even if accompanied by an opinion. Cases handled by sum-
mary disposition are included only if they are accompanied by a full
opinion of the Court and not if the only opinion is a dissent. Cases
decided by a four-four vote resulting in affirmance without written
opinion have been excluded. Both signed and unsigned per curium
opinions are considered full opinions if they set forth reasons in a
more than perfunctory manner. Cases not fitting within any of these
categories are not included in the database for any of the tables.
2. Cases Classified as Civil or Criminal
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly
understood definitions. Generally, the nature of the case is clearly
identified in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case pose a prob-
lem of classification. No cases in the 1997 Term raised such a
question.
3. Cases Classified by Nature of the Parties-Data Tables 1 through 4
Cases are included on Data Tables 1 through 4 only if govern-
mental and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is neces-
sarily true of criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from these tables
if they do not satisfy this criterion. The governmental entity might be
the United States government or one of its agencies or officials, or,
with respect to a state government, one of its political subdivisions. A
suit against a government official in a personal capacity is included if
that official is represented by government attorneys, or if the interests
of the government are otherwise clearly implicated. In instances of
multiple parties, a civil case is excluded if governmental entities ap-
pear on both sides of the controversy. If both a state and a federal
entity are parties to the same suit on the same side with only private
parties on the other, the case is included on Data Tables 1 and 2. A
case is included more than once on the same table if it raises two or
more distinct issues affecting the outcome of the case and the issues
are resolved by different voting alignments.
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4. Classification by Nature of the Issue-Data Tables 5 through 9
A case is included in each category of Data Tables 5 through 9 for
which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed by written opinion.
One case may thus be included on two or more tables. A case is also
included more than once on the same table if it raises two or more
distinct issues in the category affecting the disposition of the case and
the issues are resolved by different voting alignments. A case is not
included on a table if an issue raised by one of the litigants is not
addressed in any opinion.
Identification of First Amendment and equal protection issues
poses no special problem since the nature of each claim is expressly
identified in the opinion. Issues of freedom of speech, press, associa-
tion, and free exercise of religion are included. However, Establish-
ment Clause cases are excluded since one party's claim of religious
establishment is often made against another party's claim of free exer-
cise or some other individual right, thus blurring the issue of individ-
ual rights.
Statutory civil rights included on Data Table 7 are limited to
those invoking the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of
1965, and other civil rights statutes expressly barring discrimination on
the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, or physical
handicap. Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are include if the
substantive right asserted is based on a federal statute, or if the issue
involves the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the case at hand. How-
ever, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions are excluded if the substantive right
asserted is based on the United States Constitution and the issue re-
lates to that constitutional right. The purpose of this exclusion is to
preserve the distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional
claims.
For Data Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include
not only jurisdiction per se, but also standing, mootness, ripeness, ab-
stention, equitable discretion, and justiciability. Jurisdictional ques-
tions are excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no
member of the Court dissents on the question, even though the Court
may comment on its jurisdiction.
Federalism cases on Data Table 9 are limited to those cases in
which there were issues raised by conflicting actions of federal and
state or local governments. Common examples of these issues are
preemption, intergovernmental immunities, application of the Tenth
and Eleventh Amendments as a limit on federal government action,
and federal court interference with state court activities (other than
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review of state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal" federalism or
interstate relationships, such as those raised by the dormant Com-
merce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause, are excluded
from the table.
5. The Swing Vote Cases
Data Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a
single vote. This category also includes five-four decisions and four-
three decisions, if any, as well as five-three and four-two decisions that
reverse a lower court decision. Affirmances by a vote of five-three or
four-two are not included because a shift of one vote from the major-
ity to the minority position would still result in affirmance by a tie
vote. A case is included more than once in the table if it raises two or
more distinct issues affecting the disposition of the case and the issues
are resolved by different voting alignments.
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APPENDIX B
Study Methodology
This Study seeks to quantify three characteristics of Supreme
Court voting behavior: voting trends, mean voting percentages, and
relationships among the Justices' voting patterns. We analyze these
characteristics both for the Court as a whole and for individual Jus-
tices.'26 The following sections explain the statistical methods em-
ployed in this Study and how test results should be interpreted.
A. Scores
Each score in this Study is simply the percentage of times a Jus-
tice voted in favor of the party or claim specified by the category.
Some categories contain fewer samples than others, resulting in
coarser score increments.
B. Predictive Modeling
Data in this project were fitted to an Auto Regressive Integrated
Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting model. 27 This model is useful
in circumstances where, as in this Study, a single variable (a Justice's
score) is to be forecast based only on its present and prior values with
no other explanatory variables. ARIMA modeling is most easily ex-
plained by starting in the middle of the acronym:
Integrated: This refers to a differencing process which operates in
a manner similar to differentiation of a continuous function in
calculus. The goal is simply to remove trend from the time series data
by subtracting each score in the time series from the next score in the
series. The resulting differences form a new time series. This opera-
tion may be repeated successively until a trendless or "stationary" se-
ries results. Our model employs only one differencing operation.
Auto-Regression: Once the series has been made stationary, an
auto-regressive parameter may be determined. 28  This parameter
seeks to relate each data point in the stationary series to the data
point immediately preceding it through multiplication. That is:
126. Our ability to analyze newer Justices' voting patterns may be restricted or pre-
cluded in some instances due to insufficient data.
127. ARIMA computer modeling was accomplished using MINITAB® statistical
software with p = 1, d = 1, and q = 1. For more information regarding the ARIMA (p,d,q)
model, see Peter Kennedy, A GuIDE TO ECONoMETIcs 248-49 (1992).
128. Many statistical models employ more than one autoregressive parameter due to
various properties of the data series. Our data series produces the most the most accurate
forecasts with single-parameter (first order) AR and MA models.
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X, = AX,_1
where X, is the value of the data series at point t, A is the auto-
regressive parameter, and Xt-1 is the value of the data series point im-
mediately preceding X.
Because we are dealing with a series of data points, however, a
single parameter will almost never precisely produce the relationship
just described for all data point pairs. Some error is inevitable. We
therefore seek to determine that parameter which produces the least
total error when applied to the entire series. 12 9
Moving Average: A second parameter is determined that relates
the value of each series element X to the error between the estimated
value and the actual value of the previous element X,_1.130 That is:
X, = -Bxt-i
where -B is the Moving Average parameter. The value of this
parameter is also optimized to minimize its total error when applied to
the series.
Synthesis: The previous operations are combined into the
equation:
X, = Axt-l-Bxt-+ Et
where E, represents the residual error remaining between the cal-
culated and actual values of X,. This final equation is used to predict
the score for the following Term.
C. Mean Testing
We use a "student's t test"' 3 ' to determine whether this Term's
score (X2), departs in a statistically significant manner from the mean
of all previous Terms' scores (XI). Essentially, we treat these two
numbers as the means of two independent samples drawn from the
universe of all scores in the category.132 We hypothesize that X, is
also the true mean of the population V, and we set up this hypothesis
129. This is accomplished by applying least squares estimation, i.e., the parameter is
chosen such that the sum of the squared errors is minimized.
130. Although this operation may not seem as intuitive as the autoregression operation,
it may help to think of the error terms as "'shocks' that initially set the process in motion
and continue to keep it in motion thereafter." JOHN C. HoFF, A PRACrICA.L GuIDE TO
BOX-JENKmns FORECASTING 50 (1983).
131. For a practical perspective on this procedure, see DAVID S. MOORE & GrORGE P.
McCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACr'CE OF STATISTICS 500-18 (1993). See also CRAIG
AND HOGG, supra note 33.
132. This approach introduces potential bias problems due to non-random sampling,
small samples, and dissimilar sample standard deviations. Nevertheless, we use the test to
impose some measure of discipline in analyzing the available data.
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(the "null" hypothesis) and its corresponding alternative hypothesis as
follows:
Ho: t = X, The "null" hypothesis, i.e., X 2 does not significantly
shift p from its previous value on the real number line. Therefore, the
two samples are statistically equivalent.
Ha: V- X The alternative hypothesis, i.e., X2 significantly shifts P
from its previous value on the real number line. Therefore, the two
samples are not statistically equivalent.
We then set out to prove the alternative hypothesis, within a cer-
tain confidence interval,133 by rejecting the null hypothesis.'34 This is
accomplished by calculating the following statistic:
t = { OVERLLNE x SUB 2 - mu} OVER {s/SQRT n}
The result of this equation (t) is compared to the entry on a t-
distribution table corresponding to the confidence interval desired (")
and the appropriate number of degrees of freedom (n-k).35 If the
absolute value of t is greater than the table entry, H, is rejected and
we say that the Justice has shown a statistically significant change in
voting behavior this Term.
D. Correlation
Relationships between two Justices' voting records may be
mapped over a two-dimensional Cartesian plane as in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows a high degree of positive correlation (R2=0.7921) be-
tween the voting percentages of the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia for
the Equal Protection category. The points all fall close to an upward
sloping line. On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that the voting per-
centages of the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens show only a very
weak, negative correlation (R2=0.0473). The points are widely scat-
tered about a downward sloping line. Statistically significant correla-
tions between and among Justices' Term-to-Term voting pattens are
shown in Regression Tables 1-10. The first number in each pair is the
Pearson correlation coefficient. The second number is an R statis-
133. We have selected a confidence interval of 95%. Because this is a two-tailed test
OVERLINE x SUB 2 may shift Vi n either a positive or negative direction), " = .025.
134. A full description of the logic behind this seemingly convoluted procedure is be-
yond the scope of this article. However, its purpose is to control Type I (or alpha) error.
For a complete explanation, see MooRE AND MCCABE, supra note 131.
135. k = the number of parameters being tested; here, V is the only hypothesized param-
eter, so k = 1.
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tic.
13 6 Notice that Justices, such as Justice Breyer, for whom we have
few data points, are especially likely to show high Pearson coefficients,
but low R2 statistics. The latter is a more reliable measure of the ac-
tual level of correlation.
Equal Protection Cases
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Figure2
136. The r2 statistic is an estimate of p2, the true measure of correlation between the
dependant variable and its independent counterpart(s). The "adjusted" r2 value in the ta-
bles is a result of the computer's attempts to filter out any bias in the original r2 result.
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The correlation measured in this case is in the Term-to-Term
movement of Justices' scores. A high correlation between two Justices
does not mean that they necessarily vote together often. It simply
means that their scores tend to move up and down together from one
Term to another. Also note that correlation in no way implies
causation.
E. Factor Analysis
Factor analysis has long been used by psychologists who attempt
to identify characteristics of personality or intelligence by using bat-
teries of tests. Their challenge has been to develop tests that validly
measure the characteristics of interest. This Study similarly attempts
to measure the Justices' liberal and conservative leanings by "testing"
their disposition of certain types of cases.
We performed a factor analysis of the Study categories using Min-
itab software from Minitab, Inc. The factor loadings presented were
obtained by applying a QMAX rotation to the data. A full description
of the theory and mathematics underlying factor analysis is beyond
the scope of this appendix, but several books on the subject provide
reasonably simple explanations of this complex process. 37
F. Frontier Analysis
Frontier analysis can probably best be described with an example.
Suppose four individuals are competing for the title of "world's great-







Alan's agent would argue that the title should go to the best cro-
quet player, while Debbie's agent would argue that the best marbles
player should win. Betty's agent would argue that each sport should
receive equal weight. To see why, weigh each of the scores above by
50% and add each athlete's resulting scores together. Alan would
score (9 x 0.5) + (2 x 0.5) = 5.5. Betty would score (7 x 0.5) + (7 x 0.5)
= 7. Chuck's score would be 4.5, and Debbie's score would be 5.5.
The situation is presented graphically in the following figure:
137. See generally DENNIS CHILD, THE ESSENTIALS OF FACTOR ANALYsIs (2d ed.
1990).







A, B, C, and D represent the athletes. The solid line connecting
A, B, and D represents the athletic frontier, i.e., the boundary beyond
which no athlete has performed regardless of the relative weights as-
signed to marbles and croquet. A, B, and D are located at 100% of
the frontier. Moreover, B can be said to be super-efficient to the ex-
tent it lies beyond the line AD connecting the two points adjacent to it
on the frontier A and D are also super-efficient to the extent they lie
beyond lines (not shown) connecting B with the points at which the
frontier meets each axis. C falls short of the frontier regardless of the
weights assigned to marbles and croquet. However, an optimal set of
weights may be selected such that C "looks his best," i.e., he comes
closest to reaching the frontier.
The same concept can be applied to the Court to determine which
Justice is "most conservative" or "most liberal." However, instead of
two dimensions (croquet and marbles), the Court analysis includes
nine dimensions (all Study categories except Swing Votes). Although
human minds have difficulty envisioning nine dimensions, computers
can handle the required calculations with ease. We performed our
analysis using Microsoft Excel's solver feature. Although the formu-
las and procedures involved are straightforward, a complete descrip-
tion of them is beyond the scope of this appendix. 38
138. For more information on frontier analysis, see DONALD L. ADOLIHSON, MAN-
AGER'S TOOLKrT. MANAGERIAL SPREAs)SHEET ANALYsIs (1998).
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